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Introduction 
 
The European project, which has been an on-going endeavour to form an ever-closer union 
between the nations of Europe, has come under considerable stress ever since the outbreak of 
the global financial crisis in 2008. While the financial distress brought about by a collapse of 
the subprime mortgage markets in the United States and subsequent solvency problems of 
banks have had long-lasting ramifications the world over, nowhere in the world was the 
response the slowest and the fall-out the longest than in the countries of the Eurozone. While 
there has never been a true consensus on the exact reasons for this, a substantial number of 
both politicians and pundits have pointed to fiscal profligacy in the EU’s southern members as 
the root cause of the EU’s ailments. While this analysis may certainly have merit for certain 
states – Greece being a prime example – the theory nevertheless fails to be a plausible 
explanation that accounts for the Euro-region’s problems as a whole when one considers the 
facts.  
Fiscal profligacy, or a chronic government budget shortage, does nothing to explain 
the situation of the other countries that applied for financial assistance in the aftermath of the 
crisis. Nearly without exception, these countries were running budget surpluses that exceeded 
even those of many northwest European states in the years leading up to 2008 (Hancké 2013, 
4). It appears, therefore, that another perspective is needed to gain insight in the maladies that 
plague Europe today. This thesis will offer a critical look at the responses that the European 
Central Bank (ECB) has taken to prevent and solve the European Sovereign Debt crisis as it 
has come to be known after the initial liquidity shocks of the financial collapse turned into 
more long-term solvency issues for both banks and governments. The reason for this is two-
fold; First of all the ECB, ever since its creation in 1998 as stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty 
of 1992, is the primary institution involved with ensuring both economic harmonization and 
prevention of the exact type of crisis that occurred in 2008. Secondly the ECB, alone amongst 
the myriad institutions that the European Integration Project has spawned over the years, faces 
an existential threat in the fallout of the financial crisis. If in the near future the strains on the 
European economy become so great that it will be forced to abandon its common currency, 
the ECB will vanish with it. The bank, therefore, has both a responsibility and an incentive to 
ensure the European Monetary Union recovers.  
So what exactly has the ECB been doing to curb the effects of the financial crisis, and 
is this what it should have been doing? More concretely, what role has the European Central 
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Bank played during the European sovereign debt crisis? This paper will attempt to answer 
these questions through contrasting the actual policies of the ECB with a framework of 
expected behaviour of central banks to find out whether and in what ways the ECB deviated 
from their expected role, and for what reason. This framework will be constructed by drawing 
on the works of the economist Walter Bagehot, in particular his seminal work “Lombard 
Street: A description of the Money Market”, and others who have added and critiqued his 
work on central banking since then.  
This paper, consequently, will be structured as follows: The first chapter will 
endeavour to establish a framework for optimal central banking based on the works of 
Bagehot, in order to be able to later contrast the policy of the ECB against this index of 
Central Banking prescription to see how it lines up. The second chapter will focus on the 
inner workings of the ECB, providing insight in both the history of its creation as well the 
treaties and policy aims that underpin and shape its behaviour. It will then proceed with an 
overview of the ECB’s primary policy responses to the crisis, as well as analysing which 
problems it is trying to address with it, as well as why. The last two chapters of this paper will 
then fully be dedicated to try to bring the two together. First, it will try to isolate and analyse 
those moments were the ECB policy deviated from the expected norm. Subsequently, it will 
delve into an exploration of the possible reasons for the deviation. In conclusion, this thesis 
will bring together the main findings of the comparison to give a full account of the role of the 
European Central Bank in the European Financial Crisis, as well as provide suggestions for 
further research and policy recommendations for ECB reform. 
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Chapter 1: The Role of Central Banks 
 
In this first chapter we will discuss the central tenets of central banking as they have been 
formulated in the literature over time. By distilling the core elements of the role of central 
banks in an economy, we can construct a framework through which we can analyse the policy 
of the ECB in subsequent chapters. 
The first role of central banks we should consider is its function of maintaining price 
stability within an economic system. This role is perhaps the most conventional of the CB’s 
duties, and as it is the one that the ECB itself considers to be its primary objective, it is a 
logical starting point to begin our analysis. In actuality, maintaining price stability is related 
closely to one of the other tasks of the CB, namely its status of overseer of the money supply. 
Central Banks, ever since their introduction, have taken over the role of national mint within a 
society. While the money supply was in the past often linked to a country’s available gold 
supply, this money is nowadays often created ad nihilo – literally out of thin air. A Central 
Bank obviously cannot create money from nothing indefinitely because money, like any other 
good, decreases in value the more abundant it becomes. This decrease of the value of money 
in relation to the price of goods is known as inflation, and maintaining price stability, then, is 
ensuring that inflation stays within limit over the medium to long term. It therefore makes 
sense that the Central Bank apart from its role in the creation of money is responsible for 
ensuring price stability, is their ability to create money is effectively constrained by their 
responsibility to make sure prices remain stable. Considering this, it is easy to see why its 
next charge, the maintenance of financial stability, is somewhat more problematic. To truly 
understand why their considerable more debate surrounding the role of central banks in 
financial stability, we first have to examine the various aspects of the financial system and the 
processes involved with its stability itself. 
In the financial system, private banks both store money private individuals have kept 
with them, and offer loans to these private individuals using the capital they have in their 
vaults. These private individuals, in turn, can use this money to invest in business or increase 
their spending, bolstering the economy. The bank collects interest over their loans, and is able 
to generate a cash flow through their debt collection. The problem arises, however, from the 
fact that in most cases the value of bank loans exceeds the amount of liquidity they have in 
stock. If for whatever reason their customers decide to withdraw all of their assets at once, the 
bank runs into problems honouring their obligations. This sudden illiquidity can devolve into 
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long-term insolvency, when the amount of money owed exceeds the total amount of assets of 
a bank, triggering a collapse. Such a collapse can in turn cause uncertainty among the 
clientele of other banks, causing them to withdraw their assets as well. These bank runs allow 
the illiquidity of a few banks to spread throughout the financial system, even to banks that 
might not have been insolvent in the first place. This process is commonly known as 
contagion and is essentially self-fulfilling, since the expectation that banks will be unable to 
honour their obligation will lead to a situation where this is actually the case. Contagion and bank 
runs can wreak havoc on an economy, and will therefore certainly have repercussions for 
long-term price stability as well. In the words of Jeremy Stein (2012), banks do not behave 
socially optimal because they do not fully internalise their own costs. Both the need for an 
institution that is able to prevent the financial system from getting caught in such a destructive 
spiral, and the implications such a developments has on price stability, make the Central Bank 
the most logical option of fulfilling the responsibility over financial stability as well.  
What is more, because of their capacity to, in theory, generate unlimited amounts of 
liquidity makes them the only institution that can give a credible guarantee to the clients of 
banks and prevent bank runs. As was pointed out earlier, however, the ability of Central 
Banks to generate liquidity is in reality not unlimited because of the effects this would have 
on price stability. The two roles are therefore both intrinsically linked and to some extent 
conflicting. 
This is not necessarily the case, however, according to Henry Thornton (1802), one of 
the foremost scholars on the subject of Central Banks and financial stability. What at first 
glance appears to be an insurmountable conflict between two functions is, according to 
Thornton, simply reconciled as two roles operating under different timescales. Central Banks 
are committed to price stability in the long run whereas maintaining financial stability is only 
relevant in times of crisis, which are inherently short-lived in nature. While averting a crisis 
has some disruptive effect on price levels, in the long run the increased liquidity in the system 
is preferable to a total system collapse. With this dichotomy remedied, it can be confidently 
argued that the provision of liquidity to banks by the Central Bank to stave of a financial 
crisis – a concept that is more commonly known as Lending of Last Resort (LLR) – is as 
much a part of central banking as is keeping prices steady. There are, of course, several ways 
for CB to conduct themselves as LLR, and considering the fine balance between price and 
financial stability, many ways to do it poorly. 
In order to construct a comprehensive framework of LLR best practices, we must turn 
to the British economist Walter Bagehot and his seminal work “Lombard Street: A 
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Description of the Money Market” (1873). Bagehot’s work on Central Banking theory, which 
remains influential up until this day, can be summarised through his most famous quotation, 
which is thus: “In times of crisis, Central Banks should lend freely, against high rates and to 
sound financial institutions”. We will deal with all the separate aspects of this phrase in turn 
to get a sense of how, and under what conditions, Central Banks should act as a LLR.  
But before we do so, it is important to examine the applicability of Bagehot – writing 
almost a century and a half ago – on today’s world of economics. According to Marvin 
Goodfriend (2012), “Bagehot’s Rule is widely referenced as the rationale for central bank 
lending today”. This is remarkable for any work written so long ago, especially in a field as 
dynamic as economics. According to DeLong (2012), there are three reasons why Lombard 
Street remains such an important work in central banking theory to this day. The first is that, 
according to him, economics as a field tends to rely on statistical and theoretical models that 
fail to account for banking crises since they occur so infrequently it is difficult to integrate in 
a long-term theoretical model. The second reason is that, while crises such as the one that 
occurred in 2008 are very rare, the transmission mechanism by which they operate are 
essentially the same one as Bagehot described in the 19th century. Thirdly, and perhaps 
unsurprisingly considering the above, contemporary responses to this kind of crisis retain a 
“remarkable family resemblance to those proposed by Walter Bagehot” (DeLong, 14). It 
appears then, that Bagehot’s work can still be of relevance in understanding the expected role 
of central banks in modern society, and we can therefore confidently begin our analysis of 
Bagehot’s famous adage.  
The first notion, that during a crisis CB’s should lend freely to financial institutions 
lines up with what has been previously discussed. By using its ability to generate money it 
can credibly guarantee to the customers of a bank that the bank will be able to honour their 
debts, thereby preventing insecurity from spreading. In this respect Bagehot goes even further 
than Thornton, who argued that Central Banks have no responsibility over preventing crises, 
only over preventing their spread once they occur. Bagehot argues that the mere fact that the 
Central Bank is able and shown to be willing to give such a guarantee, already goes a long 
way to providing security to the financial system and preventing self-fulfilling shocks to the 
system in the first place. The second concept formulated by Bagehot, is that the liquidity 
provided by the Central Bank should be lent against high rates.  
There are a few reasons there should be a high price to LLR according to Bagehot, the 
most important one being preventing moral hazard. In essence, moral hazard is a situation in 
which an actor takes more risks because another actor bears the responsibility over the 
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consequences of those risks. In the context of central banking, what this means is that banks 
will be incentivized to take even bigger risks with their capital if they know they can always 
rely on the CB to bail them out. In this way, some scholars argue, a central bank acting as 
LLR to the banking system will cause those banks to become increasingly irresponsible. For 
this reason Bagehot argues that CB’s should always lend against high rates to deter banks 
from becoming overly reliant on liquidity provided by the CB and encourage them to exhaust 
all other options to stabilize their finances before seeking aid. As we will demonstrate in the 
following chapter, it is this recommendation that the ECB has most often ignored in their 
response to the financial crisis. 
The second argument for lending against high rates brings us back to the interplay 
between price and financial stability. Because of the steep cost of relying on CB assistance, 
banks will be pressured to repay their debts to the CB as soon as they possible can. This 
means that the increased liquidity that enters the system in times of crisis also drains from the 
system again as soon as possible, putting the stability of price levels under strain for no longer 
than absolutely necessary.  
It is in this second prescription that time seems to have caught up with Bagehot, and 
where most modern assessment of CB policy deviates from the policy proposed in Lombard 
Street. This is perhaps to be expected, since Bagehot wrote in a time when the currency was 
still tied to the gold standard, as opposed to a system of fiat currency. Martin (2005) argues 
that the advice to add liquidity at a very high rate was justified in relation to the "the drain of 
gold", but in a system of fiat currency a central bank can and should supply liquidity in an 
emergency against low rates. Martin therefore believes we should instead prefer Thornton’s 
analysis, who wrote in a time after the gold standard and who does not advocate a high rate 
penalty on loans. Moe (2012, 11) concurs and asserts that the preferred method of LLR 
should be conditioned on the particular type of liquidity shortage, wherein high rate penalties 
are suitable only in a situation of short-term liquidity shortage, and not during a period of 
systemic liquidity and solvability problems. While this analysis does make the important 
point that in Bagehot’s time the ability of adding liquidity was necessarily constrained by the 
gold standard, and that rates so high as to disincentivize banks from seeking CB support at all, 
it does nothing to dispel the principal reason why Bagehot advocates high penalty rates in the 
first place, namely the prevention of moral hazard. It is evident therefore that while too high 
rates are arguably as harmful as keeping them too low, high interest rates can still provide an 
effective tool in preventing irresponsibility on the part of the banks. 
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Bagehot’s last LLR recommendation is perhaps the most problematic to apply in 
practice. According to Bagehot, CB lending should only be done to “sound financial 
institutions” that can put up the required collateral to prove their health. This, once again, is 
necessary to avoid the problem moral hazard. If banks know that they will always be bailed 
out regardless of the state of their affairs, this would encourage irresponsibility in the same 
way that offering cheap loans would. In Bagehot’s mind, there is no single institution that is 
so fundamental to the economic system as a whole that it would warrant being saved 
regardless of the circumstances. Essentially – to use the common parlance most often heard in 
this context – no bank is ever too big to fail. The problem with this prescription comes down 
to the fact that it can be quite hard to distinguish insolvent banks from those that are merely 
illiquid. As Paul De Grauwe (2013) rightly points out, the two often cause or exacerbate one 
another in such a way that banks that only suffer from a short-term liquidity problem can 
become insolvent in the long run if not relieved immediately.  
There are a few other reservations to take into account before we can apply the 
recommendations by Thornton and Bagehot to the analysis of the ECB response to the 
financial crisis. First of all, both authors wrote in a time when currencies were still tied to the 
Gold Standard, so a lot their writing applies to CB’s maintaining their gold supply, which was 
naturally limited. Still, as the ability of modern CB’s to generate liquidity is similarly limited 
by their responsibility over price stability, this provides no real problems in applying the 
recommendations to the ECB. What does present a more formidable obstacle, however, is the 
extent to which their ideas can be applied to national governments rather than banks. Bagehot 
and Thornton only ever considered the role of a central bank within a national economy, and 
the situation of the ECB – effectively a Central Bank to other, national Central Banks – which 
operates in a system with multiple national governments tied to one currency over which they 
only have limited control, is markedly different. While we must be conscious of this 
limitation, there is still evidence to suggest that Bagehot and Thornton’s ideas remain as valid 
as they always have been. In particular, Paul De Grauwe’s description of the “deadly 
embrace” between banks and governments offers a compelling argument for why LLR to 
national governments is as important as it is to private banks. The reason for this, De Grauwe 
argues, is that there is strong interdependency between the sovereign and the banks. When the 
sovereign gets into problems the falling government bond prices threaten the banks, which are 
the main holders of government debt. When the banks collapse, governments that do not want 
to let down the banks are threatened with insolvency. If one of the two falls off the cliff the 
other one is pulled down also. Any Central Bank committed to saving the economic system, 
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therefore, cannot hope to accomplish this by ignoring the fate of sovereign governments. This 
goes doubly so for a situation where the collapse of a government threatens the stability of a 
currency that is shared by multiple national governments. Contagion does not only happen in 
the banking sector, it may very well occur between users of a same currency as well. 
So, what characteristics must a credible Central Banking strategy possess? As has 
become apparent in this chapter, a CB cannot afford to ignore its duties when it comes to 
maintaining financial stability, as in doing so it would risk adversely affecting price stability 
as well. When and if a CB finds itself in a crisis, it must be willing to commit itself fully to 
guaranteeing the security of the financial institutions it deems sound – be they banks or 
sovereigns. When acting as a Lender of Last Resort to these institutions, it must only ever 
offer their assistance at a steep rate, though not too steep as to disincentivize banks from 
seeking assistance at all, to ensure responsibility on the part of the banks and governments 
and to allow the added liquidity to depart the system as soon as possible. Now we have a 
clearly established outline of preferred central banking policy, we can use it to contrast the 
theory to the reality of ECB policy responses to the crisis. Before we do so, however, we must 
dedicate some attention to the institutional history of the ECB to gain insight in the 
regulations and processes that govern its decision-making. A table briefly summarizing the 
chief policy recommendations can be found below. 
 
 
 
 
Policy Recommendations: Lend freely, against high rates, to sound financial institutions 
 
What? How? Why? 
Lend freely Inject liquidity into the system 
by making extra credit available 
to financial institutions for as 
long as is necessary  
To prevent contagion by 
providing a credible guarantee 
to banks and reassure their 
clients of their long-term 
viability. 
Against high rates Requiring high penalty in the 
form of interest rates on the 
loans provided. 
To prevent moral hazard, by 
ensuring banks exhaust all their 
option before coming to the CB, 
and by incentivizes banks to 
repay their debts at the earliest 
possible moment 
To sound financial institutions Gathering information on the 
health of financial institutions 
to gain insight in their long-
term viability 
To prevent moral hazard by 
lending only to institutions that 
can put the money to good use, 
and to prevent waste caused by 
lending to irresponsible 
institutions.  
	 11	
Chapter 2: The institutional history of the European Central Bank 
 
Before we can properly analyse the European policy responses to the European Sovereign 
debt crisis, it is important to get a clear view on the nature of the institutions most closely 
committed to this task. This chapter will provide an overview of the founding history of the 
ECB, its legal base, policy aims and decision-making structure and an account of its policy 
responses since 2008 up until the present day. Gaining insight into the actual workings of the 
ECB is important, because it allows us not only to determine what exactly they have been 
doing since the outbreak of the crisis, but also because it provides us with clues into the 
reasons behind the policy. By combining both its history and institutional make-up with its 
policy agenda, we can get an insight not only into the what, but also the why of European 
Central Banking. 
Finding a useful starting date for our story is a bit more problematic than taking the 
foundation date of the institution, June 1st 1998, and proceeding from there. While the ECB 
was officially established and became a legal entity on this date, most of the underlying 
treaties and regulations that govern its behaviour had already been p set out. On the other 
hand, economic integration is one of the longest and most extensive aspects of European 
integration, so giving a complete account of the central bank’s history could take us all the 
way back to the Treaty of Rome in 1958 or at the least the Marlin Memorandum of 1962 
which first initiated real discussion on monetary integration within the European Community. 
As such a detailed history is well outside the scope of this paper, we will confine ourselves to 
its history since the Delors Report, which first concretely outlined the necessary steps towards 
a monetary union, and the Maastricht Treaty, which established both the common currency of 
the Euro and the ECB as the institution responsible for it. The Delors Report (1989) was the 
result of a commission chaired by then European Commission President Jacques Delors in 
order to devise a specific roadmap towards European monetary integration, proposed three 
“discrete but evolutionary steps” to fully establish the European Monetary Union. Stage One 
would complete the internal market and reduce existing disparities between the economies 
eligible for participation. Stage Two would set up the organisational structure and basic 
organs of the EMU, serving as a transitional phase before the final stage and aimed to 
strengthening economic convergence. Stage Three would then, finally, lock exchange rates 
between currencies and the institutions related to monetary integration – the European Central 
Bank – would enter into force and be assigned their full responsibilities (Schaller 21). 
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Stage One commenced on the 1st of July 1990, and at this point all restrictions on the 
movement of capital were lifted and the Council of Governors of central banks was given 
extra responsibilities. While Stage One could still be implemented under the pre-existing 
framework of the Community, the implementation of Stages Two and Three would require 
institutional reform, and as a result an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on EMU was held 
in November 1990. This IGC resulted in the drafting of the Treaty of European Union, more 
commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty, which set out most fundamental legislation for the 
EMU and ECB and was signed and ratified in 1992 and 1993, respectively. Stage Two started 
in 1994 with the establishment of the European Monetary Institute (EMI), which is the 
predecessor organization of the ECB and fulfilled the same function, albeit on a much smaller 
scale and with a much more limited mandate. It was essentially created as a transitional body 
between the Council of Governors and the ECB, and it’s main two tasks were strengthening 
central bank cooperation and monetary policy coordination on the one hand, and making the 
necessary preparations for the introduction of the ECB and the single currency on the other 
(Scheller 26). The last phase of the Delors Report, Stage Three, officially started on January 
1st, 1999 with the announcement of the changeover to the Euro in 2002 after a transition phase 
of three years. It was on this same date that responsibilities for the European monetary system 
were transferred from national central banks and the EMI to the ECB. 
The articles of the Maastricht Treaty and other relevant regulations were initially 
supposed to be consolidated into a European Constitution. This constitution faced opposition 
in several Member States, however, and ultimately never came to pass. Subsequently, the 
legal basis and aims of the ECB were amended first through the Amsterdam and Nice treaties, 
and finally through the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) which amended the two treaties that form the 
constitutional basis of the European Union: the Maastricht Treaty –also known as the Treaty 
on European Union – and the Treaty of Rome, which was subsequently called the “Treaty on 
the Functioning of European Union” (TFEU). Although the list of regulations on the 
functioning of the ECB and the Euro system are extensive and diverse, there are a few article 
that are worthy of special attention. Article 127(1) of the Maastricht Treaty defines the aim of 
the ECB to “maintain price stability” and continues “Without prejudice to the objective of 
price stability, the ESCB* shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a 
view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 
3 of the Treaty on European Union" (Maastricht Treaty). Price stability, as defined by the 
Council of Governors in 1988, was defined as “inflation around 2% annually on the medium 
term.” Further tasks of the Euro system and the ECB were laid out in Article 127(2), 
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including such responsibilities as defining and implementing monetary policies for the 
Eurozone, conducting foreign exchange operations, managing foreign reserves and to promote 
smooth operations of financial markets. 
Another obvious but nevertheless important duty is the issuance of Euro banknotes, to which 
it has the exclusive right. Furthermore, under the Treaty, the ECB is expressly prohibited 
from borrowing money or buying government bonds from member states directly. As will 
become apparent in the following chapters, both the prohibition of lending directly to national 
governments and the explicit narrow focus on price stability will provide important clues in 
explaining the behavior of the ECB during the crisis. 
The three decision-making bodies of the ECB are overseeing the mandate that is 
derived from these aforementioned treaties. The day-to-day governance of the institutions 
falls to the Executive Board, which is composed of the President and Vice-president of the 
Bank and four other members (ECB governing council). The members of the executive board 
are not elected but appointed "from among persons of recognized standing and professional 
experience in monetary or banking matters by common accord of the governments of the 
Member States at the level of Heads of State or Government, on a recommendation from the 
Council, after it has consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the 
ECB" (article 11.2 sec statute). The Governing Council is the main decision making body of 
the ECB, and consists of the members of the executive board and the governors of national 
central banks (ECB Governing Council). Lastly, the General Council deals with matters 
relating to the adoption of the Euro, and will continue to exist until all EU members have 
adopted the Euro, at which point it will be dissolved. 
Following from the institutional characteristics of the ECB, we can conclude that the 
ECB’s primary function is to preside over the monetary system of the EU, ensure prices 
remain stable and issue the national central banks with currency. The way it does this differs 
drastically from the system other central banks – such as the US Federal Reserve – use, 
namely the buying of government bonds and Treasury securities. As the ECB is constrained 
by the Treaty in doing it in a similar way, it instead provides liquidity to banks through 
repurchase (repo) auctions. In essence, this amounts to the approximately 1500 private banks 
that are eligible bidding on short-term contracts by offering collateral, usually government 
debts or other valid securities, in exchange for liquidity. These contracts last anywhere from 
two weeks to three months, and must be repaid at the due date. On due-date, the repo 
contracts become available again, and the auction begins anew. By increasing or decreasing 
the contracts available for auction, the ECB can manipulate the amount of liquidity in the 
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system. In theory, the stringent requirements of membership to the European Union should 
ensure that the assets offered as collateral are all equally good and protected from the risk of 
inflation. With regards to the crisis response of the ECB, there are in principle two different 
policy tools the ECB has implement, being their Long-Term Refinancing Operations and the 
Covered Bond Purchasing Program. 
A Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) is a system of cheap loans to European 
Banks. Its process is similar to the repo contract auctions, with banks backing up their loan 
request to the ECB through their own national bank, effectively assuring that all collateral is 
assessed nationally and up to standard. The key difference between LTRO’s and a normal 
repo auction is the duration, with LTRO’s having a much longer repayment due date than 
repo’s. Their main goal is to provide banks with the needed liquidity to honour their debt 
obligations and to boost cash flows in the market and to stave of a credit crunch or bank 
collapse. 
The Covered Bond Purchasing Programme is a program that allows the ECB to 
purchase government bond securities from private banks. Because of the stipulations of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the ECB is unable to purchase sovereign bonds outright, but by buying or 
accepting them as collateral from private credit institutions, the ECB is able to circumvent 
this condition in a limited capacity. Quantitative Easing is another important concept in 
understanding the crisis response of the ECB. In essence, QE is a non-standard monetary 
policy measure in which a central bank buys financial assets from private financial 
institutions, raising the value of those assets by increasing demand while also increasing the 
money supply into the financial system. The CBBP, therefore, is a policy tool that can be 
described as a form of QE. 
At the outbreak of the crisis, the first policy response by the ECB was intended to 
address the acute insolvency and liquidity problems faced by banks because of the financial 
shocks of the crisis. When the standard policy of repo auctions became insufficient in 
supplying liquidity to the economy, the ECB moved on to a system of fixed-rate full allotment 
– the previously mentioned LTRO’s. It also lowered the rating threshold for collateral, 
making it easier for banks to apply for loans, and engaged in currency swaps with many major 
CB’s, including the FED and the Bank of Japan. After a while, it introduced its first round of 
CBPP to make sure that the system maintained enough liquidity and to encourage financial 
institutions to increase their lending through this new liquidity. In the first half of 2010 the 
situation of the financial markets seemed to be improving, and the balance sheet of the ECB 
even decreased slightly, the first time since the start of the crisis when it increased by around 
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30%. However, the perception existed that such “non-standard monetary policy”, as the 
liquidity injections such as LTRO were seen, could be dangerous because of the extensive 
intervention in the money market could lead banks to become to dependent on the ECB and 
take away their incentives to become solvent on their own. These fears, combined with the 
misguided presumption that the crisis would be short-lived, led the ECB to stress that such 
measures were to be “temporary in nature” (ECB 2011).   
This interlude of stability lasted until May 2010 when the initial liquidity crisis 
transitioned into a long-term sovereign debt crisis, with the Greek government officially 
asking for financial aid in April of that year. In the span of a year Spain, Ireland and Portugal 
would also request assistance in curbing their rapidly increasing budget shortages. Initially, 
however, the ECB was very reluctant to perform the role of “lender of last resort” to these 
sovereigns both because of the stipulations of the Maastricht Treaty and the fear that such 
behavior would conflict with its objective of price stability. During this phase of the crisis, the 
only new program worth mentioning is the Securities Markets Program (SMP), which 
allowed the ECB some limited intervention in both public and private debt securities, 
counterbalanced with specific operations aimed at taking liquidity out of the system again to 
preserve price stability.  
While the situation seemed to improve up until the summer of 2011 – with the ECB 
even increasing interest rates for the first time in a long while, and opting not to renew SMP – 
the situation once again rapidly deteriorated as both crisis, financial and sovereign debt, re-
intensified. This “diabolic loop” finally prompted the ECB to announce in August 2012 that 
all their non-standard monetary policy would remain in place as long as necessary, which had 
a reassuring effect on the banking system which had previously demanding more liquidity as 
a precaution because of the uncertainty over the duration of the policies. It is at this moment 
in the crisis that the ECB seems to move closer into the role of lender of last resort, to the 
banking system at least. Subsequently, it elected to increase the duration of its LTRO’s and 
reinstated SMP, which amounted up to 220 billion euros in sovereign bonds in February 2012. 
The LTRO’s now amounted up to 1 trillion euro’s (Rodriguez and Carrasco 2014). 
The ECB, in an effort to solve the European Financial Crisis, has made use of two 
different policy tools. On the one hand, it attempted to prevent a credit crunch and to supply 
the banking sector with liquidity to honor their debt obligations through its LTRO program. 
Secondly, it tried to mitigate some of the banks debt by buying their debts, mainly in the form 
of government bonds, by implementing several rounds of CBBP. While initially hesitant to 
provide this assistance to banks, and even more reluctant to do so for national sovereigns that 
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were suffering under the strains of the prolonged crisis, the ECB gradually shifted tactics by 
reassuring the markets their non-standard policy measures would stay in place for as long as 
necessary. In the following chapter we will examine exactly how the described policy of the 
ECB adheres to the prescriptions given in Chapter 1 and, perhaps more importantly, where 
and in what ways it deviated from Bagehot’s rule.  
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Chapter 3: Between Bagehot and the ECB 
 
Now that we have an understanding of both the theoretical characteristics of central banking 
policy as well as an overview of the policy responses of the ECB itself, we can begin to 
analyse how the actual crisis response of the ECB lines up. The first aspect we will address is 
the way the ECB conducted itself as an LLR. As we have seen previously, the ECB was 
initially very reluctant to commit itself to this part of its duties. Only after both the financial 
and sovereign debt crises re-intensified in the summer of 2012 did the ECB change their 
stance on the issue, beginning with the announcement that the “ECB would do anything 
within their mandate to preserve the Euro”, later followed by the switch from ‘[non-standard 
measures are] temporary in nature’ to ‘policy stance will remain accommodative for as long 
as needed’ in April 2013. The third, in April 2014, showed the possibility of implementing 
unconventional instruments (the first time the word unconventional was used in an ECB 
conference) due to the risk of a too prolonged period of low inflation. This was reaffirmed in 
June 2014, when Draghi, president of the ECB, assured that the ECB has ‘decided to intensify 
preparatory work related to outright purchases in the [Asset-Backed Security] ABS market to 
enhance the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The reason why this 
shift is significant is because the change from temporary non-standard policy to a more long-
term approach goes a long way towards reassuring the banks that they can continue to rely on 
the ECB to aid them through the crisis. Without such an assurance, the situation remains 
uncertain since banks do not know for how long they can still rely on the ECB, and will act 
accordingly, inhibiting the transmission of liquidity to the rest of system. 
This shift in policy strategy did only occur after the crisis had been holding Europe in 
its grip for well over 4 years however, and this sluggish response has had some serious 
ramifications for the development on the financial markets since 2008. Until the moment that 
the ECB changed its stance that all of their non-standard monetary policy would be temporary 
in nature, banks had no way of knowing when and in what way the behaviour of the ECB 
would change at any moment, and at which point they might unexpectedly have to do without 
assistance from the ECB. This unpredictability led to the banks hoarding most of the funds 
they were receiving from the ECB instead of supplying them as loans to private citizens, 
which inhibited the ability of the economic system to restore itself to pre-crisis conditions. So, 
when we take into account the recommendation of Bagehot to “lend freely”, we can see that, 
in the initial phase of the crisis, the ECB did not conduct itself in the way that one would 
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expect, in rhetoric at least. While the ECB did indeed start injecting liquidity in the system 
early on, their insistence that these measures would be temporary in nature negated the 
reassuring effect such a tactic would normally have on the system, had it overtly committed 
itself. So the ECB has only reluctantly played its role as a lender of last resort, but has it at 
least taken the recommendation of only lending to sound financial institutions to heart?  
On the face of it, this seems to be the case: the aforementioned Repo system used by 
the ECB, which ensures loans are only given to those 1500 banks that fulfill the requirements 
to be eligible for ECB-assistance, combined with the already stringent membership 
requirements to the Eurozone should guarantee no financially unsound institutions are being 
bailed out. This, too, becomes slightly more problematic when applied to the situation 
regarding national sovereigns. While the ECB is bound to the Maastricht Treaty and should 
therefore not be financially supporting national governments, solvent or otherwise, it is at 
least indirectly committed through its CBPP buying of government bonds from private banks. 
Because of this, the same scrutiny of solvency applied to other financial institutions should be 
applied to national governments. From this perspective, the involvement of the ECB in the 
Greek bailout in particular becomes rather suspect. Whatever indicators one chooses to assess 
the situation with, it is apparent that Greece is almost a prototypical example of the kind of 
insolvent institution Bagehot warned against supporting. This brings us to a rather interesting 
conclusion. When we apply Bagehot’s recommendation not to lend to insolvent firms to the 
case of Greece, it can be argued that the preferred strategy should have been not to bail out 
Greece. This is in line with Bagehot’s assertion that no institution is ever too big to fail to 
warrant saving them at all costs, but considering Greece’s position within the European 
Monetary Union and the implications its collapse would have for the common currency it 
shares with the other EMU members, it appears that this is a situation for which Bagehot did 
not account for. 
The final component of Bagehot’s recommendation, the prescription that any financial 
assistance from a CB should come at a high price, is the one point at which the ECB policy 
strayed furthest from the norm. The LTRO’s – the ECB’s principal liquidity injection policy 
tool after it shifted to its non-standard monetary policy – were intended to provide the banks 
of the Eurozone with capital in order to finance their operations and stave of a credit crunch. 
These loans, however, were lent against such low interest rates that let some pundits to 
describe them as “free money”. While these liquidity injections were of utmost importance to 
stabilize the European banking system in the short run, the decision to offer this credit against 
such low rates goes directly against the commendation to require debtors to pay a high price 
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for these loans. The result is moral hazard; the cheap and freely available capital 
disincentivize banks from restructuring their institutional infrastructure, which makes a repeat 
of the same situation as occurred during the outbreak of the financial crisis likely. Secondly, 
there is no pressure on banks to exhaust all their other options before coming to the ECB to 
ask for assistance. This means that the ECB would have to inject much more liquidity into the 
system than it otherwise would have, putting price stability under even more pressure.  
Considering the above, we can conclude that the ECB crisis response strategy differs 
from the recommended strategy in key ways. First of all, the ECB is, and has always been, 
reluctant to truly commit to its role of lender of last resort. Its slow response has allowed the 
crisis to escalate more than was ever necessary, had it been immediately willing to fully 
guarantee the financial system and its dependents.  It was even more unwilling to provide 
lending of last resort to sovereigns. Considering the deadly embrace between national 
governments and the banking system, this reluctance has inhibited their ability to be a 
competent LLR to the banking system even further. Where it did step up and provide aid to 
national governments, this was done in an indirect fashion, and not always to financially 
sound sovereigns. The decision to support the Greek government directly contradicts the 
recommendations, but considering their position within a currency union, this can 
nevertheless have been inevitable. This would mean that such an interdependent structure as 
the EMU would be an exception that Bagehot had not accounted for when he postulated that 
no institution was ever too big to fail. While the unique situation of the sovereigns within the 
Euro system leaves the question whether the financial assistance to Greece was truly out of 
line up in the air, the decision to generate liquidity against very low rates is a clear deviation 
from the prescriptions. By lending against low interest rates, the ECB disincentivized the 
banks from bringing their operations up to standard and led to moral hazard. It is apparent that 
there are key ways in which the ECB policy differed from the perspectives of the scholarly 
world.  The next and final chapter of this thesis paper will be dedicated to trying to find out 
why the ECB conducted itself in the way that it did. What institutional, political or legislative 
factors underpinned the behaviour of the ECB during the financial crisis? 
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Chapter 4: Explaining ECB Behaviour and its Role in the Crisis 
So why has the ECB acted in the way that it did? The answer can be found in a variety of 
factors. As mentioned earlier, there are various legal obstacles embedded in the treaties of the 
European Union that inhibit the ECB’s ability to act in accordance to the recommended 
strategy of Central Banks. There is also the matter of central banking independence, which 
makes it difficult for the ECB to act in way that can be seen as overly political. Because of its 
situation of appointed, rather than elected, leadership that must always be wary of political 
favouritism, its behaviour always comes under extra scrutiny. Yet it has also realized that it 
cannot hope to maintain price stability if it cannot prevent banking and sovereign collapse. It 
is therefore caught in the paradoxical situation of being limited in fulfilling its own mandate 
by its own mandate. While its role of LLR to the banking system is not all too controversial, it 
being the same to sovereigns in expressly forbidden by article 123 of the Treaty. Considering 
it needs to bail out sovereigns to ensure price and financial stability, it has always had to use 
interesting rationalisations of its behaviour to prove that it has not acted outside of its legal 
mandate. 
Its legal mandate notwithstanding, there are a few other considerations the ECB has 
with the bailing out of national sovereigns. The ECB, like any other Central Bank, is founded 
on the principle of political independence. This is a double-edged sword. While on the one 
hand this independence ensures that no government of any of the euro countries exerts undue 
political pressure on the institutions, the ECB itself must always be wary of becoming overly 
political in its policy as well. The danger of any LLR operation, and especially those aimed at 
national governments, is putting present and future taxpayers at risk. The financial base of the 
ECB is funds originated indirectly – through the member states of the EMU – from the 
taxpayers of the member states. Because of the independence of the ECB, these taxpayers 
have only limited say in the activities of the ECB, and therefore there is an arguable 
democratic deficit when it comes to conducting LLR operations. While it can certainly and 
confidently be argued that foregoing its duties in maintaining financial stability would put all 
taxpayers under much bigger risk, it is for this reason the ECB has never been overly keen in 
providing explicit financial guarantees. 
Unsurprisingly, in recent times the ECB has been trying to shift its LLR 
responsibilities away from its core policy. The European Stability Mechanism is one such 
example. Established in September 2007, the ESM is an institution designed with the explicit 
purpose of providing financial assistance to national governments. It is funded exclusively 
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through contributions of member states, and has a capacity of 500 billion euros. While in 
principle designed to relieve the responsibility of LLR of the ECB, there are a few crucial 
reasons why the ESM could never truly replace the ECB in this regard. First of all, there is the 
matter of its limited budget. Considering the total amount of funds the ECB has already 
dedicated to ensuring financial stability, the budget of the ESM could never hope to amount to 
the same scope. It can also be argued that it is not the size of the ECB bailouts, but the 
implicit guarantee that goes along with the ECB’s capacity to provide unlimited capital that 
makes it an effective LLR. Since the ESM does not have this same ability, it is unlikely it can 
be as credible an LLR (De Grauwe, 2011). There is another reason stemming from the ESM’s 
institutional make-up as to why it would be a less effective provider of loans to sovereigns 
than the ECB would be. The ESM operates under a full consensus decision-making structure, 
and is therefore not insured against politicization in the same way that the independent ECB 
is. Full consensus means that any of the national governments committed to the ESM will 
have a de facto veto vote over any proposed LLR operation the ESM would conduct (De 
Grauwe 2013, 18). Considering the significant political opposition against LLR in some 
member states, it is likely the ESM will for the most part not be an effective LLR institution. 
The ECB, in short, is trapped on the one hand by the necessity to provide at least 
limited assistance to national sovereigns to fulfil its price stability mandate, and the legal 
constraints of its founding treaties that explicitly prohibit such assistance on the other. It has 
therefore always needed to justify its LLR to sovereigns by stressing such operations are 
necessary to fulfil its goal of maintaining price stability. While conducting LLR of any kind, 
it always has to be wary of overstepping its political limits, as any provision of assistance puts 
the taxpayers of the EMU at risk. Because the taxpayer does not have any direct influence 
over the proceedings of the ECB, any policy conducted by the ECB runs the risk of inviting 
serious debate over the democratic deficit of the institution. In this light, it is unsurprising that 
the ECB has tried to move its LLR responsibilities to the ESM. It is apparent, however, that 
the ESM is unfit to take over these duties of the ECB. Its limited budget and the likelihood of 
political gridlock will do nothing to fill the void of LLR within the EMU, and while the shift 
would certainly relieve some of the institutional headaches of the ECB, in the end it is 
unlikely to provide a sustainable solution to its worries. Another noted deviation of policy of 
the ECB has been the low interest rates associated with its loans. While this seems to go 
directly against Bagehot’s prescription, there is an important development currently plaguing 
the EMU that Bagehot’s theory seemingly did not account for. Over the last few years, the 
ECB has not been worried quite as much by inflation as it has been by the looming spectre of 
	 22	
deflation. Deflation is even more damaging to a recovering economy than periods of high 
inflation, since it leads consumers and businesses to postpone their purchases, prolonging 
economic depression. It is also very harmful because, according to Bernoth et al (2014), “it 
limits the ability of monetary policy to ensure price stability using traditional and well-proven 
monetary instruments”(16). This is because the conventional policy tool to combat deflation 
is the lowering of interest rates, which apart from inspiring moral hazard also leaves the ECB 
without standard monetary policy tools when interest rates reach zero. Deflation or even very 
low rates of inflation make reducing the real debt burden that much harder, so it is seen to be 
imperative to prevent prolonged low inflation or deflation at all costs. This traps the ECB in a 
situation where they cannot apply the prescribed monetary policy for fear of exacerbating the 
problems in the euro-zone even further. Considering the very real threat of deflation, this 
seems inevitable, but this does leave the ECB with the equally real problem of moral hazard 
in the long run.  
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Conclusion 
 
What has been the role of the European Central Bank during the European Financial Crisis? 
Observing the crisis since its start in 2008, we can see that the ECB has had the most 
difficulty with its role as the Lender of Last Resort. While it picked up this role relatively 
quickly with regards to the banking system, it did so in a way that is counterintuitive when 
one considers the implications of lending on such a large scale against such low rates. The 
provision of cheap credit, while being very effective in staving of a credit crunch and liquidity 
problems on the financial markets, has the adverse effect of encouraging moral hazard in the 
banking system. When the banks have easy access to cheap credit, there is no incentive to 
restructure their financial operations to the point where they can prevent a repeat of the exact 
same situation that led to the crisis in the first place. Furthermore, since there is no incentive 
for banks to repay their debts as quickly as possible, the ECB has no credible strategy for 
allowing this excess capital to drain from the system, thereby compromising its policy goal of 
maintaining price stability. It is apparent that, in order to competently fulfil its duties as 
keeper of price stability, the ECB must re-examine its position with regard to Lending of Last 
Resort. Since it cannot hope to maintain price levels without also maintaining stability in the 
banking system – as the financial crisis has demonstrated – it is high time for the duty of 
financial stability to become an explicit goal of the ECB.   
The Bank performs even more poorly when it comes providing LLR to national 
sovereigns. Here, once again, its own legal basis prevents it from playing this role, and this 
complicates its ability to fulfill its mandate. While the bank was initially very reluctant to 
provide assistance to national sovereigns at all, it slowly adopted a strategy to at least prevent 
the collapse of national sovereigns, albeit in an indirect way. Because of the stipulation of the 
EU Treaty that the ECB cannot provide assistance to national sovereigns, it always had to 
move very carefully, and always had to justify this aspect of its policy by presenting it as 
fundamental to its price stability goal. There is no doubt, however, that the ECB did at least to 
some extent perform this role of LLR to national sovereigns. While this is perhaps inevitable 
because of the extensive interdependency between the banks and the sovereign, there remain 
some interesting questions to be answered with regard to saving financially unsound national 
sovereigns, in this particular case Greece.  
The fate of the Greece is fascinating because it both objectively financially unsound 
and crucial to the health of the common currency area as a whole, a situation that Bagehot had 
not foreseen when he postulated that Central Banks should only lend to healthy financial 
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institutions. The applicability of the adage “no institution is ever too big to fail” within a 
system of multiple countries with a single currency should prove an interesting avenue for 
further research. The implications the situation of national sovereigns has for the future ECB 
policy are twofold. First, if providing guarantees for national sovereigns is crucial to ensuring 
financial (and therefore price-) stability within the European Monetary Union, he ECB must 
be explicit in this objective. If it is not forthright about its objective of providing LLR to 
national governments, this creates unnecessary insecurities that can only serve to exacerbate 
future crises. Second, if it does choose to become an explicit LLR to sovereigns, it needs to 
work out how to be an effective LLR in line with the prescriptions of Bagehot and Thornton, 
especially in the way it conducts itself with regard to financially unhealthy sovereigns. The 
greatest obstacle here lies, as with all lending of last resort, with preventing moral hazard.  If 
allowing a national sovereign to collapse can be lethal to the health of the entire EMU, 
encouraging irresponsibility by offering unlimited, unconditional guarantees is even more 
dangerous.  
At present, however, it is unlikely that the ECB will be headed in this direction. The 
treaties on which it is based are difficult to amend, and the political willpower to increase the 
mandate of the bank are lacking. Instead, it seems the ECB is attempting to move its LLR 
responsibilities into other mechanisms, particularly the European Stability Mechanism. While 
divorcing its price stability duties from the imperative of ensuring financial stability as well 
relieve some of the biggest pressure of the ECB, it is unlikely that the ESM is up to the task. 
For starters, its financial capacity is for too low, and at any rate the fact that it does not have 
the ability to generate theoretically unlimited amounts of liquidity like the ECB has means it 
cannot give an as credible guarantee to the markets. Furthermore, since it is an organization 
that operates with a full consensus decision-making structure between all members, it runs the 
serious risk of having all of its policy becoming politicized, something that the principle 
independence of the ECB was supposed to prevent. It therefore appears that, if the ECB wants 
to prevent the same type of crisis from repeating, it must seriously consider stepping up to its 
role of Lender of Last Resort. 
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